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A FLY IN THE OINTMENT: PROMESA’S DRAFTING ERROR
IN SECTION 314(b)(7)
ABSTRACT
When Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, Congress precluded
Puerto Rico from seeking bankruptcy relief under chapter 9 (municipal
bankruptcy). There is no satisfactory explanation for the exclusion because no
legislative history exists to offer an explanation. Embroiled in a $123 billion
debt crisis1 and left without a remedy, Puerto Rico enacted its own municipal
bankruptcy law in 2014, in an effort to restructure some of its public debts.
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,2 the U.S. Supreme
Court conclusively held that § 903 of the Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto
Rico’s own municipal bankruptcy law.3 Recognizing that Puerto Rico was truly
left “in a no man’s land,” Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight
Management and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”) in 2016 to assist
Puerto Rico in restructuring its debts. PROMESA uniquely established the
Financial Oversight and Management Board (“Oversight Board”) to provide a
method for Puerto Rico to achieve fiscal responsibility. The Oversight Board
has the sole discretion to determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent
with an applicable certified Fiscal Plan.
An internal inconsistency exists in PROMESA despite the apparent
dichotomous roles of the Oversight Board and the court. Section 314(b)(7)
hinders the efficiency of the bankruptcy system for two reasons. First, it gives
the district court a meaningless power by inadvertently permitting the court to
determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal
Plan. Second, it negates the sole discretionary authority of the Oversight Board.
To effectuate the fundamental goal of a bankruptcy proceeding, § 314(b)(7) of
PROMESA should be removed to resolve the conflict it creates.

1
Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.
bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-puerto-rico-debt-crisis/.
2
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
3
Id. at 1940.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free
Trust4 bifurcated the definition of “State” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code
(“Code”). If Puerto Rico were considered a “State” for all purposes, perhaps its
fate would have been different today. The Court concluded that, while Puerto
Rico is a “State” subject to the preemption provision in § 903 of the Code, Puerto
is not a “State” for purposes of who may be a debtor under chapter 9 (municipal
bankruptcy).5 In fact, § 101(52) of the Code specifically excludes Puerto Rico
and the District of Columbia from being able to seek federal bankruptcy relief.6
This raises the question: why? The truth is that Puerto Rico’s anomalous
treatment in the Code had neither attracted much of Congress’s attention7 nor
been questioned until Puerto Rico was actually buried in debt.
No legislative history explains Congress’s decision to exclude Puerto Rico
from seeking federal bankruptcy relief.8 However, there are several theories that
suggest Congress’s rationale for doing so. One such theory is that Congress
“goofed” when it amended the Code in 1984.9 Another theory suggests that
Congress may have wanted to protect American investors in the U.S. mainland
by preventing Puerto Rico from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy laws that
“may or may not treat their nationwide creditors fairly.”10
Realizing Puerto Rico’s anomalous position of not being able to enact its
own municipal bankruptcy laws, Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight
Management and Stability Act (“PROMESA”) and established the Financial
Oversight and Management Board (“Oversight Board”) to provide the indebted
island an avenue of bankruptcy-like relief.11 In general, the Oversight Board is
charged with providing a method to achieve Puerto Rico’s fiscal responsibility

4

Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938.
Id. at 1946.
6
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012).
7
Stephen Mihm, Bankruptcy was Option for Puerto Rico Before Congress Goof, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-12-03/bankruptcy-was-option-for-puerto-ricobefore-congress-goof.
8
Id. (quoting Kenneth Klee’s testimony).
9
See id.
10
See Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico Fights for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy in Supreme Court, N.Y TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-fights-for-chapter-9bankruptcy-in-supreme-court.html (quoting Matthew McGill, attorney who represented the creditors in Puerto
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust).
11
Stephen Perez-Nuño, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June
29,
2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisisn601291.
5
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and economic growth.12 The district court for the covered territory is charged
with confirming a debt restructuring plan for the treatment of different classes
of creditors against Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities (“plan of adjustment”
or “plan”).13
At a macro level, the fundamental purpose of the federal bankruptcy laws is
to give debtors a “fresh start” from burdensome debts.14 At a micro level, the
statutory goal of a debt reorganization case under the Code is to get a plan of
reorganization15 confirmed by the court. It can be argued that the statutory goal
of a debt adjustment case under PROMESA is to get a plan of adjustment
confirmed by a district court, which has the original and exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over all debt adjustment cases.16
Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA (“Confirmation”) hinders the efficiency of
the bankruptcy system because (1) it gives the court a meaningless power by
inadvertently permitting the court to determine whether a plan of adjustment is
consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan; and (2) it negates the sole
discretionary authority of the Oversight Board. Among other requirements,
§ 314(b) provides that the court shall confirm a plan of adjustment if it is
consistent with an applicable Fiscal Plan.17 While this may seem innocuous at
first, the duty to approve and certify a Fiscal Plan is solely reserved to the
Oversight Board.18 PROMESA makes it quite convincing that it is the Oversight
Board’s exclusive responsibility to “certify a plan of adjustment only if it
determines, in its sole discretion, that [the plan] is consistent with the applicable
certified Fiscal Plan.”19 To effectuate the fundamental goal of a bankruptcy
proceeding, § 314(b)(7) of PROMESA should be removed from § 314(b) to
resolve the conflict created by its inclusion.
This Comment begins by explaining the historical development of American
municipal bankruptcy law and providing the background facts necessary to
understand what gave rise to the enactment of PROMESA. Additionally, this
Comment provides information that offers an insight into the origins of Puerto

12
PROMESA, Pub. L. No. 114-187, Title I, § 2(a), 130 Stat. 553 (2016) (codified as amended at 48
U.S.C. § 2121(a) (2016)).
13
See 48 U.S.C. § 2174.
14
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 381 (2007); Process – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics.
15
This Comment uses “plan of reorganization” and “plan of adjustment” synonymously.
16
48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(1).
17
Id. § 2174(b).
18
Id. § 2141(c).
19
Id. § 2124(j)(3) (emphasis added).
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Rico’s financial instability and its current economic status. The Analysis Section
delineates how PROMESA differs from the Code with respect to the plan
confirmation process. This Comment then deconstructs the language of
§ 314(b)(7) to demonstrate not only the conflict it creates, but its redundancy.
Finally, this Comment concludes by offering a way to remove that internal
inconsistency to maximize the efficiency of the bankruptcy system.
A. Historical Development of American Municipal Bankruptcy Law
Before the current Bankruptcy Code became effective in 1978, the first
federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“Bankruptcy Act”) was the law in place.20 The
Bankruptcy Act was Congress’s exercise of power to establish a uniform system
of bankruptcy laws throughout the United States—a power expressly granted by
the U.S. Constitution.21 Congress’s intent to create a uniform system of
bankruptcy laws throughout the United States is evidenced by the inclusion of
“Territories . . . and the District of Columbia” as “States” for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act,22 which coincides with the year of United States’ annexation
of Puerto Rico as a U.S. Territory.23 But when Congress codified the laws to
form the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it decided to remove the definition of “State”
entirely from the definition section.24 When the Code was amended in 1984,
Congress reincorporated the definition of “State” with a kicker—it redefined
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia as “States,” but excluded both from
being debtors25 under chapter 9 of the Code.26
Municipal bankruptcy is a relatively recent phenomenon in American
bankruptcy law.27 Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy legislation in
1934 (“Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation”) as a result of the Great

20
KENNETH N. KLEE & WHITMAN L. HOLT, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1801−2014, 201
(1st ed. 2014).
21
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to enact uniform laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States); see also Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944.
22
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
23
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1945.
24
Id.
25
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (defining debtor as a “person or municipality concerning which a case under
this title has been commenced”).
26
11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) (“The term ‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”); 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101 (16th ed. 2017); Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal
Reorganization Act— Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act
No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1321–22 (2015).
27
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (16th 2018).
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Depression,28 and the 1934 Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation was added to the
Bankruptcy Act as Chapter IX.29 Congress was aware of the Municipal
Bankruptcy Legislation’s potential interference with the sovereign powers of the
states, as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,30 but
nonetheless saw the need to provide a remedy to over 1,000 powerless
municipalities that were in default on their bond payments during the Great
Depression.31 Prior to this new legislation, municipalities had been unable to
provide remedies to their creditors because the U.S. Constitution forbade the
states from impairing obligations of contract.32 After additional revisions to the
existing Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation, the resulting legislation became a
permanent part of the Bankruptcy Act in 1946.33
Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act remained unchanged and unused for 30
years until 1975, when New York City’s financial crisis during President Gerald
Ford’s administration provided the impetus for major changes to the Municipal
Bankruptcy Legislation.34 Chapter IX as it existed was virtually unusable by a
large city, such as New York City.35 One of the requirements for relief under
Chapter IX was that 51 percent of creditors had to accept a plan before a petition
could even be filed.36 This was problematic because a major municipality could
hardly be expected to even locate 51 percent of its bondholders, due to the sheer
number.37 After rejecting the Ford administration’s proposed revision to the
legislation,38 Congress revised Chapter IX for all municipalities throughout the
United States.39 The 1976 revision was part of the bankruptcy law reform
process that Congress initiated in 1970, and this process ultimately resulted in
the enactment of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978.40

28
Many rural municipalities were unable to meet their interest and principal obligations on their bonds
due to depressed market and low prices for farm products. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
29
Id.
30
See Ashton v. Cameron County Water District, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (holding the Municipal Bankruptcy
Legislation unconstitutional as an improper interference with the sovereignty of the states).
31
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
32
U.S. Const. art I, § 10, cl 1; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH (16th 2018).
33
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
The legislation the Ford administration proposed was limited to the adjustment of debts of
municipalities with populations of one million or more. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
39
Id.
40
Id.

JOHCOMMENTPROOFS_7.11.19

650

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

7/11/2019 10:07 AM

[Vol. 35

There is no clear reason for why Congress excluded Puerto Rico from
seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code,41 as there is no trace of legislative
history or indication of Congress’s intent,42 except for the plain language of the
amended Code. “What explains Congress wanting to put Puerto Rico in this
anomalous position of not being able to restructure its debt?”43 “Why would
Congress preclude Puerto Rico from Chapter 9?”44 These are some of the
questions that Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court asked when arguments were
presented before the Court for Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free
Trust45 in March of 2016. As described in the following paragraphs, several
theories suggest why Congress barred Puerto Rico from chapter 9 in 1984.
Since the amendments in 1984, many have asked the question of why
Congress would want to prevent Puerto Rico from restructuring its debts. This
is the question that everybody asks, for which there is no answer.46 Matthew
McGill, the attorney who represented Puerto Rico’s creditors in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, offered a theory.47 Mr. McGill said that the
amendment was not that mysterious if one considered Congress’s long history
of micromanaging Puerto Rico’s indebtedness.48 By 1984, Puerto Rico and the
District of Columbia49 were the two most indebted territories.50 Congress’s
encouragement of a widespread purchasing of the tax-exempt Puerto Rican
bonds may have led Congress to protect American investors by making it hard
for Puerto Rico to renege or write its own municipal bankruptcy laws.51
The attorney for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Christopher Landau,
offered an alternative explanation to the question. Mr. Landau said that “legal
provisions were being misread, and Congress had not really intended to shut

41
Congress also excluded District of Columbia from seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 101(52).
42
Walsh, supra note 10.
43
Id. (quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
44
Id. (quoting Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.).
45
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
46
Walsh, supra note 10.
47
See id.
48
Walsh, supra note 10 (citing a 1917 federal law that limited the amount of debt that Puerto Rico could
take on).
49
In 1995, Congress established the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management
Assistance Authority (“DC Control Board”) and vested the DC Control Board with broad powers to balance
Washington’s budget. Jon Bouker, The D.C. Revitalization Act: History, Provisions and Promises, in BUILDING
THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE WORLD 81, 81–82 (2008) (available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/appendix-1.pdf).
50
Walsh, supra note 10.
51
Id.
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Puerto Rico out of bankruptcy.”52 A hypothesis that corroborates Mr. Landau’s
theory is that Congress had simply made a drafting error when it amended the
Code in 1984.53 The legislators may have excluded Puerto Rico and the District
of Columbia from access to federal bankruptcy law in a “bizarre oversight,”
when they redefined the definition of “State.”54 Unfortunately this radical
change in Puerto Rico’s status—from once being eligible to seek federal
bankruptcy relief to being excluded after the 1984 amendments—stirred no
debate or question in Congress until Puerto Rico’s debts recently became
unsustainable.55
1. Congress Takes Away Puerto Rico’s Eligibility to File for Municipal
Bankruptcy
There are two requirements that must be met to commence a bankruptcy case
under any operative chapter of the Code.56 The first is that a debtor must have
capacity to file a bankruptcy petition.57 For example, a legal entity that seeks to
reorganize its debt under chapter 1158 must be validly existing upon the filing of
the petition under applicable state law.59 The second requirement is that a debtor
must be eligible to file a petition.60
The 1976 revision to the Municipal Bankruptcy Legislation permitted a
municipality to file a petition under Chapter IX if it was “generally authorized”
by state law to do so.61 The adoption of the phrase “generally authorized” was
the result of a compromise between the House version and the Senate version of
the 1976 Act, in which the Senate had proposed a municipality had to be
“specifically authorized” by state law to be eligible to file a municipal
bankruptcy.62 The broad language of “generally authorized” left its
interpretation open to the courts, as it was not clear how “general” the
authorization had to be in order for a municipality to satisfy the statutory
52

Id.
Walsh, supra note 10.
54
Mihm, supra note 7.
55
Id.
56
KLEE & HOLT, supra note 20, at 196.
57
Id.
58
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS
AND BUSINESSES 25 (4th ed. 2015) (“Chapter 11 contemplates a comprehensive financial restructuring of the
debtor and that the debtor and creditors will negotiate a plan for payment of creditors that is to be approved by
the bankruptcy court.”).
59
KLEE & HOLT, supra note 20, at 196.
60
Id.
61
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
62
H.R. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16–17 (1976) (“Conference Report”).
53
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requirement.63 While many courts construed the language broadly, the
bankruptcy court for the Western District of Pennsylvania concluded in 1990
that a state statute did not give sufficient general authorization to file a
bankruptcy petition.64 Following this decision, the 1994 Act amended
§ 109(c)(2) of the Code (“Who may be a debtor”), by deleting the original
language—“generally authorized”—and replacing it with the Senate’s language
of the 1976 Act—“specifically authorized.”65
This amendment effectively negated § 109(c) of the Code, which sets out the
requirements for whom may be a debtor under chapter 9. Among other statutory
requirements, § 109(c) provides that an entity may be a debtor under chapter 9
if and only if the entity is a “municipality” and “is specifically authorized, in its
capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State
law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to
authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter . . . .”66 Because Puerto
Rico cannot specifically authorize its municipality to be a debtor under chapter
9, since it is not a “State” for purposes of who may be a debtor under chapter 9,
it became ineligible to commence a municipal bankruptcy case under the Code.
This then raised a question: Could Puerto Rico enact its own municipal
bankruptcy laws?
2. Puerto Rico Cannot Enact its Own Bankruptcy Laws
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case67 that addressed whether a
state could enact its own municipal bankruptcy laws, holding that a New Jersey
municipal bankruptcy statute was not preempted by the federal bankruptcy
laws.68 The Court’s analysis stemmed from the constitutional analysis of who
may be a debtor69 in United States v. Bekins.70 In Bekins, a state had authorized—
i.e., gave consent to—its municipality to seek bankruptcy relief under the federal
63

See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH; see In re Carroll Township Auth., 119 B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that that language of the state statute, “to sue, be sued, implead, be impleaded, to
complain and/or defend in all courts” and “to do all acts and things necessary to convenient for the promotion
of [their businesses] and the general welfare of the [authorities], and to carry out the powers granted to [them]
by this act” was inadequate general authorization).
65
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH.
66
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1)–(2).
67
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Ashbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
68
See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1945 (discussing Faitoute and its holding that the federal
bankruptcy laws did not preempt New Jersey’s municipal bankruptcy laws, which required municipalities to
seek relief under state law before resorting to the federal bankruptcy law).
69
11 U.S.C. § 109(c).
70
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
64
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bankruptcy laws before the municipality actually filed a petition.71 To override
the Court’s decision in 1942,72 Congress added a preemption provision, now
codified in § 903 of the Code (“Reservation of State power to control
municipalities”), that limits the states’ powers to enact their own municipal
bankruptcy laws.73 Section 903 of the Code now reads:
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control,
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality,
including expenditures for such exercise, but—a State law prescribing
a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not
bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition . . . .74

To analyze a chapter 9 case, one must determine whether the debtor is
eligible to file a municipal bankruptcy75 before determining whether the debtor
is preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution76 from enacting
its own municipal bankruptcy laws.77 When a debtor is ineligible to file a chapter
9 bankruptcy case under § 109(c), then any state law enacted to authorize the
debtor to seek bankruptcy relief under the Code will be preempted by the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.78
Table A. Section 109 and Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code.
§ 109. Who may be a debtor.
§ 903. Reservation of State power
to control municipalities.
(c) An entity may be a debtor under
This chapter does not limit or
chapter 9
impair the
of this title if and only if such
power of a State to control, by
entity—
legislation
(1) is a municipality;
or governmental powers of such

71
See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (discussing the outcome of Bekins and the Court’s
constitutional analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)).
72
See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 316 U.S. 502.
73
See Act of July 1, 1946, 60 Stat. 415 (1946); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 903.LH.
74
11 U.S.C. § 903.
75
Id. § 109(c).
76
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
77
11 U.S.C. § 903; see Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944 (“the provision of the Bankruptcy
Code defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 9, which [the Court refers to] here as the ‘gateway’ provision,
requires the States to authorize their municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9 before the municipalities may
file a Chapter 9 petition . . .”).
78
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New
Municipal Reorganization Act— Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014
P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1323 (2015) (predicting how the Recovery Act was likely to be
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause).
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(2) is specifically authorized, in its
capacity
as a municipality or by name,
to be a debtor under such
chapter by State law, or by a
governmental officer or
organization empowered by
State law to authorize such
entity to be a debtor under such
chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust
such
debts; and
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municipality, including
expenditures for
such exercise, but—
(1) a State law prescribing a
method of
composition of indebtedness
of such
municipality may not bind
any
creditor that does not consent
to
such composition; and
(2) a judgment entered under
such a law
may not bind a creditor that
does not
consent to such
composition.

(5)(A) . . .

In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,79 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Puerto Rico is not a “State” for purposes of § 109(c) (“Who may
be a debtor”), but that it is a “State” for purposes of § 903 (“Reservation of State
power to control municipalities”).80 The Court’s conclusion that Puerto Rico is
not a “State” for purposes of § 109(c) means that Puerto Rico does not have the
power to authorize its municipalities to seek relief under chapter 9 pursuant to
§ 109(c)(2).81 Yet the Court concluded that Puerto Rico is “no less a ‘State’ for
purposes of the preemption provision than it was before Congress amended the
definition.”82 The bifurcation of the meaning of “State” as applied to different
provisions in the Code seems absurd, but the language of the Code is clear.83
Puerto Rico can neither seek relief under chapter 9, nor can it enact its own
municipal bankruptcy laws.

79

Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938.
Id..at 1946.
81
Id. at 1946.
82
Id. at 1947.
83
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court and reasoned that the plain text of the Bankruptcy
Code begins and ends the statutory analysis. See id. at 1946 (2016).
80
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Recognizing that Puerto Rico was truly left “in a no man’s land,”84 Congress
enacted PROMESA in June of 2016 to assist the government of Puerto Rico and
its instrumentalities in managing its public finances.85 PROMESA established
the Oversight Board and delegated sweeping powers to the Oversight Board to
manage Puerto Rico’s fiscal policies. This bill was not met without opposition
by members of the Congress and the public. Many residents of Puerto Rico
dubbed the Oversight Board a “Colonial Control Board”86 and the bill itself a
“Colonial Control Bill.”87 Senator Bob Menendez88 filibustered the bill for four
hours in opposition before the Senate approved it.89 In a speech before the Senate
floor, Senator Menendez said:
Mark my words—if we don’t seize this opportunity to address this
crisis in a meaningful way, we’ll be right back here in a year from now
picking up the pieces. So while it’s absolutely clear that we need to act
and act decisively and expediently to help our fellow citizens in Puerto
Rico, just as importantly, we need to get this right.90

The general consensus in Congress, however, was that the bill was a necessary
compromise to restructure Puerto Rico’s outstanding debts.91
All of these outcomes are the products of Congress’s decision to exclude
Puerto Rico from seeking relief under chapter 9 of the Code. While Congress
could have amended the Code to allow Puerto Rico the same measure of relief

84
Brief for Appellant-Petitioner at 13-14, Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938
(2016) (No. 15-233).
85
48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241.
86
But see Tony Favro, Troubled US Local Government Divided over Benefits of Fiscal Control Boards,
CITYMAYORS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.citymayors.com/finance/us-fiscal-control-boards.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2019) (“Control boards are not meant to be democratic, but efficient. Their focus is on re-establishing
long-term fiscal stability, and the wishes of citizens and elected officials for particular services are often
ignored.”).
87
See “A Dark Day for the People of Puerto Rico”: U.S. Senate Moves to OK “Colonial Control Board”
(Democracy Now! television broadcast June 29, 2016), https://www.democracynow.org/2016/6/29/a_dark_
day_for_the_people (transcript available on Democracy Now! website).
88
The only Latino Senator to vote against the bill, he condemned the bill saying “PROMESA exacts a
price far too high for relief that is far too uncertain.” See Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to
Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS (June 30. 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-howpromesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741.
89
See “A Dark Day for the People of Puerto Rico”, supra note 87.
90
Senator Bob Menendez, Speech in Opposition to H.R. 5278, PROMESA (May 24, 2016) (available at
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-speaks-in-opposition-to-house-puertorico-bill).
91
See generally 114 CONG. REC. H.R.162−91 (June 9, 2016) (Rep. Grijalva: “When measured against a
perfect bill, this legislation is inadequate. When measured against the worsening crisis in Puerto Rico, this
legislation is vitally necessary.”).
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available to every other state, Congress failed to do so. Political arguments aside,
PROMESA is Puerto Rico’s only option.
Although modeled on chapters 9 and 11 of the Code,92 PROMESA is an
entirely separate piece of legislation from the Code, enacted to assist the
Government of Puerto Rico, including its instrumentalities, in managing its
public finances. PROMESA contains seven “titles,” which are somewhat
comparable to the various chapters in the Code. Title I (“Establishment and
Organization of Oversight Board”) establishes the Financial Oversight and
Management Board for Puerto Rico.93 Title II (“Responsibilities of Oversight
Board”) lays out the process for developing, submitting, approving, and
certifying fiscal plans and budgets for Puerto Rico.94 Title III (“Adjustments of
Debts”) includes provisions that govern the adjustment or reorganization of debt
through a “plan” proposed by the debtor,95 voted on by creditors, and confirmed
by the court.96 Title IV (“Miscellaneous Provisions”) contains miscellaneous
provisions, such as rules of construction97 and the right of Puerto Rico to
determine its future political status.98 Title V (“Puerto Rico Infrastructure
Revitalization”) creates the position of the “Revitalization Coordinator”99 to
review and permit certain infrastructure projects within Puerto Rico.100 Title VI
(“Creditor Collective Action”) provides a mechanism to formalize negotiated
agreements between Puerto Rico and its creditors.101 And finally, Title VII’s
(“Sense of Congress Regarding Permanent, Pro-growth Fiscal Reforms”) sole
section states that “any durable solution for Puerto Rico’s fiscal and economic
crisis should include permanent, pro-growth fiscal reforms that feature, among
other things, a free flow of capital between possession of the United States and

92
D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R44532, THE PUERTO RICO OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND
ECONOMIC STABILITY ACT (PROMESA; H.R. 5278, S. 2328) 15 (2016).
93
48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2121–2129.
94
See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2141–2152.
95
While it is the norm for the debtor to file a plan of adjustment in either chapter 9 or 11 of the Code, in
a bankruptcy proceeding under Title III of PROMESA, only the Oversight Board may file a plan of adjustment
of the debts of the debtor. See 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a).
96
See AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15. See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2161–2177.
97
48 U.S.C. § 2191.
98
48 U.S.C. § 2192 (“Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to restrict Puerto Rico’s right to determine
its future political status . . . .”). See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2191–2200.
99
A person appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico to review and permit “Critical Projects,” as defined
in § 501(2) of PROMESA. 48 U.S.C. § 2212.
100
See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2211–2217.
101
John E. Mudd, Title VI of PROMESA: Creditor Collective Action, MUDDLAW (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://johnmuddlaw.com/2017/03/09/title-vi-of-promesa-creditor-collective-action/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
See generally 48 U.S.C. §§ 2231–2232.
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the rest of the United States.”102 This Comment focuses primarily on Title III,
with some discussion of Titles I and II.
B. Origins of Puerto Rico’s Economic Instability and the Birth of PROMESA
No single factor caused Puerto Rico’s economic crisis; rather, multiple
combined factors led to Puerto Rico’s dramatic economic decline in the last
decade.103 Puerto Rico has been experiencing negative economic growth since
2006, largely owing to the eroding tax base due to migration to the U.S.
mainland and low population growth.104 Worsening economic conditions
propelled vicious economic cycles in which migration was further accelerated
and recovery was impeded.105 Poor fiscal management and inefficient
government spending were also damaging factors; debts now owed to
bondholders exceed 100 percent of Puerto Rico’s GNP.106
In general, the Puerto Rico Office of Management and Budget oversees
Puerto Rico’s public agencies, but it does not oversee public corporations or
municipalities.107 Puerto Rico has an unusually large number of public
corporations108 that play a prominent role in the economy.109 Public corporations
provide some of the most essential public services, such as banking, public
infrastructure, health care, and electricity.110 Puerto Rico’s weakly-regulated
public sector is illustrated by the high rates of electricity for paying customers,
partially attributable to the Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority’s
(“PREPA”)111 decades-long practice of giving free electricity to all of Puerto
Rico’s municipalities, many government-owned enterprises, and even some forprofit businesses.112

102

48 U.S.C. § 2241.
Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S States
and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222–23 (2017).
104
Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Puerto Rico’s Debt Dilemma and Pathways Toward Sovereign
Solvency, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 9, 15–16 (2017).
105
Id. at 16.
106
Block, supra note 103, at 219.
107
AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30.
108
Block, supra note 103, at 224; see AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30, 31 (“Puerto Rico’s public sector is
composed of a Commonwealth government, some 50 public corporations . . . and municipal governments,
among other instrumentalities.”)
109
AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 30.
110
Id. at 31.
111
Public corporation that provides electricity to Puerto Rico. See Block, supra note 103, at 223.
112
Id. at 223–24.
103
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In 2015, the President of Puerto Rico’s Government Development Bank
(“GDB”), the government’s fiscal agent, testified that over the past eight years,
outstanding public debt had increased by more than sixty percent while the
economy had contracted by more than twenty percent.113 In fact, bonds issued
by public corporations account for over a third of Puerto Rico’s public debt.114
“Historically, Puerto Rico’s public corporations have either issued bonds in the
capital markets or received financial support from GDB to cover budget deficits
and fund capital improvements; however, the fiscal crisis has effectively
foreclosed both sources of funding and put public corporations at risk of
default.”115
For years, investors flocked to purchase tax-exempt Puerto Rican bonds.116
The favorable tax treatment of Puerto Rican bonds is defined by the JonesShafroth Act of 1917, which granted U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto
Rico117—and more relevantly—authorized the government of Puerto Rico to
issue bonds and exempted all of the issued bonds from taxation by the U.S.
government.118 This extraordinary U.S. tax policy encouraged investors to
purchase more and more Puerto Rican bonds and led to excessive governmental
borrowing that has “concealed deficits and structural shortcomings.”119 By 2014,
all major credit-rating firms downgraded Puerto Rico’s bonds to non-investment
grade, otherwise known as “junk” status.120
Even on the eve of bankruptcy, Puerto Rico continued to issue its junk status
bonds, as hedge funds piled into Puerto Rico to purchase its debts at a discount
price with high interest rates.121 Unlike a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, in which
the debtor is an individual or a business entity122 with contending rights against
its creditors, the impact of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis is far more devastating on
113

Id. at 224.
Block, supra note 103, at 224.
115
Municipal Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. —
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1320, 1321 (2015).
116
Mary Williams Walsh, The Bonds that Broke Puerto Rico, N.Y TIMES (June 30, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/07/01/business/dealbook/the-bonds-that-broke-puerto-rico.html.
117
Jones-Shafroth Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64–368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
118
See id. (“[A]ll bonds issued by the government of Puerto Rico . . . shall be exempt from taxation by the
Government of the United States . . . or by any State, or by any county, municipality, or other municipal
subdivision of any State or Territory of the United States . . . .”).
119
Accord Park & Samples, supra note 104, at 17.
120
Block, supra note 103, at 219.
121
Michael Corkery & Mary Williams Walsh, Message of Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Easy Bets Sometimes
Lose, N.Y TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/business/dealbook/puerto-ricocreditors-hedge-funds.html.
122
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(41), 109(b).
114
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the debtor—Puerto Rico—because it is the people, collectively, who suffer the
weight of the economic burden. Since 2016, Puerto Rico has drastically reduced
its public services, benefits and employment, and increased taxes to generate
more revenue.123 Puerto Rico’s debt crisis has resulted in closing over 150
schools, laying off public sector workers, proposing to reduce the minimum
wage, and forcing the population to migrate to the U.S. mainland.124
In March of 2016, a federal district judge held that Puerto Rico is “insolvent
and no longer able to pay its debts as they become due.”125 Puerto Rico needed
help, but avenues of relief available to Puerto Rico were practically nonexistent.
Seeking relief under the Code was out of the question because Congress had
excluded Puerto Rico from seeking such relief.126 Puerto Rico then took matters
into its own hands by enacting the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt
Enforcement and Recovery Act (“Recovery Act”).127
On the other side of the bankruptcy coin is the creditors’ rights against the
debtor. When Puerto Rico attempted to pass the Recovery Act to restructure its
public debts, many hedge fund creditors sued immediately to prevent the
enactment of the law.128 Even some of “Wall Street’s savviest hedge funds” did
not expect to be engaged in such a prolonged battle to protect their
investments.129 The problem seems to be that “[m]any of the creditors think they
are, or should be, first in line for the money,”130 thus eluding a solution to Puerto
Rico’s debt problem. The Recovery Act was soon found to be preempted by the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and by § 903 of the Code and
therefore struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court.131 Congress acted quickly to
enact PROMESA, giving Puerto Rico a temporary solution at best.

123
Natasha Lycia Ora Bannan, Puerto Rico’s Odious Debt: The Economic Crisis of Colonialism, 19
CUNY L. REV. 287, 288 (2016).
124
Bannan, supra note 123, at 292–93.
125
AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 32.
126
11 U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101 L.H.
127
Municipal Bankruptcy—Preemption—Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act—
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1320, 1322 (2015). The Recovery Act was meant to address the absence of recovery and reorganization
relief for Puerto Rico’s public corporations. Therefore, Puerto Rico itself was ineligible to seek relief under the
Recovery Act. See GOV’T DEV. BANK FOR P.R., SUMMARY OF THE PUERTO RICO PUBLIC CORPORATION DEBT
ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT 2 (July 31, 2014), http://www.gdb-pur.com/documents/
SummaryoftheRecoveryAct.pdf.
128
Bannan, supra note 123, at 288.
129
See Corkery & Walsh, supra note 121.
130
Corkery & Walsh, supra note 121.
131
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1944.
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Notwithstanding its unconstitutionality,132 Puerto Rico’s enactment of the
Recovery Act was an effort to provide consensual agreements to Puerto Rico’s
creditors and provide a statutory basis under which to restructure its debts.133
The purpose of the Recovery Act was to “allow[] public corporations . . . to
adjust their debts in the interest of all creditors affected thereby, provide[]
procedures for the orderly enforcement and, if necessary, the restructuring of
debt . . . , and maximize[] returns to all stakeholders.”134 By way of illustration,
the Recovery Act resulted in a consensual and voluntary extension of PREPA’s
expected principal payment to its creditors, including sixty percent of its bond
holders, merely days after the Recovery Act was passed.135
I.

ANALYSIS

PROMESA is the first statute of its kind enacted to address municipal
bankruptcy in a U.S. Territory, as Puerto Rico is the first U.S. Territory to have
defaulted. The Bankruptcy Code serves as an excellent benchmark to compare
the efficacy of PROMESA’s procedures with respect to plan confirmation.
When the basic provisions of the 1976 revision were incorporated into the Code,
§ 901 of the Code (“Applicability of other sections of this title”) incorporated
provisions of the Code’s chapters 3, 5, and 11 into chapter 9 (“Adjustment of
debts of a municipality”) and made those provisions applicable to municipal debt
adjustment cases.136
Because of such wholesale incorporation, chapter 9 takes up very little space
in the Code.137 Not surprisingly, PROMESA incorporates more than half of all
of the sections in chapter 9 and modifies the remaining unincorporated sections
to fit into Title III of PROMESA: Adjustment of Debts.138 This is not surprising

132
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Recovery Act unconstitutional in Puerto Rico v.
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1945 (2016), one law review article correctly anticipated the
statute would “likely [be] unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause” of the U.S. Constitution. See Municipal
Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. — Puerto Rico Public
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1320, 1323
(2015).
133
Municipal Bankruptcy — Preemption — Puerto Rico Passes New Municipal Reorganization Act. —
Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1320, 1321 (2015).
134
Id. at 1322 (quoting 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 71, Statement of Motives, pt. D) (internal numbering
omitted).
135
Id. at 1323.
136
See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the Code are general provisions that
apply to all of the operative chapters, such as chapters 7, 9, and 11. AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15.
137
Chapter 9 contains only twenty sections in its entirety.
138
Among many others, § 301 of PROMESA incorporates §§ 902, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 942,
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because Congress probably needed a starting point to come up with new
legislation, and the Code already spelled out what needed to be done in order for
a municipality to file for bankruptcy.
A. Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code
Chapter 11 is frequently referred to as reorganization bankruptcy.139 In every
chapter 11 case, there must be a plan of reorganization voted into acceptance by
the debtor’s creditors and confirmed by the bankruptcy court.140 Under § 1121
of the Code, the debtor has an exclusive period during which it may file a plan
of reorganization.141 The proposed plan must include a classification of claims142
and must specify how each claim or interest of a particular class will be treated
under the plan.143 Section 1122(a) provides that if a plan places a claim or an
interest in a particular class, then such claim or interest must be substantially
similar to the other claims or interests of such class. Only creditors whose claims
are “impaired” may vote on whether to accept or reject the plan.144 The Code
defines an impaired class as a class of creditors whose legal, equitable, and
contractual right to payment is altered in any way under the plan.145
Under § 1126(c) of the Code, an entire class of claims is deemed to have
accepted a plan if the plan is accepted by creditors who hold at least two-thirds
in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims under
§ 502.146 An accepted plan that is confirmed by the court binds the debtor and
any creditor.147 Section 1129(a) of the Code sets out a comprehensive list of
sixteen requirements that must be satisfied in order for the court to confirm a
plan.148

944, 945, and 946 of the Code to Title III.
139
Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/
bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics.
140
Id.
141
The debtor has 120 days to file a plan after the date of order of relief and 180 days to get the plan
accepted after the date of order of relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(b)–(c).
142
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (“Claim” means “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured . . . .”).
143
11 U.S.C. § 1123; accord. Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, supra note 139.
144
Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basis, supra note 139.
145
See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1).
146
Allowance of claims or interests.
147
11 U.S.C. § 1141(a).
148
See id. § 1129(a).
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Much of the chapter 11 framework is incorporated into the proceedings
under Title III (“Adjustment of Debts”) of PROMESA. Among others, § 301(a)
of PROMESA incorporates §§ 1122, 1126(c), 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3),
1129(a)(6), 1129(a)(8), and 1129(a)(10) of the Code. Generally, Title III
includes provisions for a plan of adjustment to be proposed by the Oversight
Board, voted on by the creditors, and confirmed by the court.149
B. Debt Adjustment under PROMESA
The scope of a Title III proceeding is much broader than that of a chapter 9
proceeding under the Code.150 PROMESA gives the government of Puerto Rico
the eligibility151 to seek bankruptcy-like relief under Title III. The term
“Government of Puerto Rico” means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
including all of its territorial instrumentalities,152 designated by the Oversight
Board in accordance with § 101 of PROMESA.153 At its meeting on September
30, 2016,154 the Oversight Board designated sixty-three entities that would be
subject to oversight under PROMESA.155 Thus any political subdivision and
public agency designated by the Oversight Board as a covered entity, such as the
Puerto Rican Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”),156 is considered a territorial
instrumentality.
The Oversight Board consists of seven individual voting members selected
from a list of individuals submitted by the leaders of the House of
Representatives and Senate and appointed by the President of the United
States.157 The Governor serves as an eighth ex officio member of the Oversight
149

AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 15.
General Guidelines to PROMESA Title III, MCCONNELL VALDÉS LLC (May 5, 2017),
http://www.mcvpr.com/newsroom-publications-PROMESA-TitleIII.
151
48 U.S.C. § 2162.
152
Id. § 2104(11); Id. § 2104(19)(A) (“The term ‘territorial instrumentality’ means any political
subdivision, public agency, instrumentality—including any instrumentality that is also a bank—or public
corporation of a territory, and this term should be broadly construed to effectuate the purposes of this Act”).
153
48 U.S.C. § 2104(7).
154
The Oversight Board and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has held more than 30 meetings with
creditor representatives to work toward achieving a consensual financial restructuring from December 2016
through March 2017. Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title III Petition at 5-6, In
re Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-cv-01567-LTS (D. P.R. May 3, 2017), http://www.prd.
uscourts.gov/promesa/sites/promesa/files/documents/1/01-2.pdf.
155
Id.
156
PREPA is one of Puerto Rico’s principal public corporations that supplies substantially all of the
electricity consumed in Puerto Rico and “owns all transmission and distribution facilities and most of the
generating facilities that constitute [Puerto Rico]’s electric power system[. . . .]” Id.
157
48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(1). The President selects six members from the lists of recommendations and may
select one member in the President’s sole discretion. See AUSTIN, supra note 92, at 7.
150
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Board without voting rights.158 In general, each appointed member serves a term
of three years159 and serves without compensation.160 Section 101(e)(2) of
PROMESA (“Oversight Board Appointed Members”) details the
recommendation and selection mechanisms for appointed members.161 To be
eligible for appointment as a member of the Oversight Board, the individual
must have “knowledge and expertise in finance, municipal bond markets,
management, law, or the organization or operation of business or government
. . . .”162
PROMESA sets out specific requirements that must be met before the
Oversight Board can certify and the court can confirm a plan of adjustment.
Section 314(b)(7) provides that the court shall confirm a plan if the plan satisfies
all of the seven requirements under that provision. It states, among other things,
that the court shall confirm a plan that is certified by the Oversight Board if “the
plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan163 certified by the Oversight
Board under title II.”164 This is an important point because § 314(b)(7) is the
only provision under § 314(b) that requires the court to review the Oversight
Board’s certification determination, contributing to the assertion that
§ 314(b)(7) creates an internal inconsistency. A distinction must be made
between a plan of adjustment and a Fiscal Plan because only the court can
confirm a plan while only the Oversight Board can approve a Fiscal Plan.
Requiring the court to review whether the plan is consistent with the applicable
Fiscal Plan is inherently contradictory.
Each Fiscal Plan contains the phrase “submitted, approved, and certified in
accordance with § 201 [(“Approval of Fiscal Plans”)]”165 as part of its definition.
Section 5(10) of PROMESA defines Fiscal Plan as “a Territory Fiscal Plan or
158

48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(3).
Id. § 2121(e)(5)(A).
160
Id. § 2121(g). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (“After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed
administrative expenses . . . including the actual necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate . . . .”)
with 48 U.S.C. § 2121(g) (2012) (“Members of the Oversight Board shall serve without pay, but may receive
reimbursement from the Oversight Board for any reasonable and necessary expenses including by reason of
service on the Oversight Board.”).
161
For example, 48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(2)(E) provides that an individual selected from a recommended list
is not subject to Senate confirmation, but an individual appointed by the President who is not selected from a
recommended list is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
162
There are two requirements to be eligible for appointment. The first is discussed in this Comment. The
second is that an individual must not be “an officer, elected official, or employee of the territorial government,
a candidate for elected office of the territorial government, or a former elected official of the territorial
government” prior to appointment. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(f).
163
See 48 U.S.C. § 2104(10).
164
Id. § 2174(b)(7).
165
Compare 48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) with 48 U.S.C. § 2104(22).
159
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an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan, as applicable.” As suggested by its colloquial
meaning, the term “Territory Fiscal Plan” means a fiscal plan for the
Government of Puerto Rico.166 Because there are more than sixty territorial
instrumentalities designated by the Oversight Board that are subject to oversight
under PROMESA,167 there may be more than just a single Fiscal Plan.168
Section 201 of PROMESA (“Approval of Fiscal Plans”) outlines a four-step
process in the making of a Fiscal Plan: development, submission, approval, and
certification.169 The Governor must first develop and submit a proposed Fiscal
Plan to the Oversight Board by a specified time.170 If the Oversight Board
determines that the Fiscal Plan satisfies all of the requirements under subsection
(b) of the same section, then the Oversight Board must approve the proposed
Fiscal Plan.171 Finally, if the Oversight Board has approved the Fiscal Plan, then
it must deliver a compliance certification for the approved Fiscal Plan to the
Governor and the Legislature.172
The Oversight Board has the discretion to require the Governor to develop
an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan173 that is separate from the Territory Fiscal
Plan.174 Alternatively, it may require the Governor to include a covered
territorial instrumentality in the Territory Fiscal Plan.175 As of February 22,
2017, the Oversight Board has received five Instrumentality Fiscal Plans by five
of the covered instrumentalities.176 The Oversight Board has previously certified
166
48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(14), 2104(22); see 48 U.S.C. § 2104(18) (“The term ‘territorial government’ means
the government of a covered territory, including all covered territorial instrumentalities.”); see also 48 U.S.C.
§ 2104(8) (“The term ‘covered territory’ means a territory for which an Oversight Board has been established
under section 101.”).
167
Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title III Petition at Exhibit B, In re
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 17-cv-01567-LTS (D. P.R. May 3, 2017), http://www.prd.uscourts.gov/
promesa/sites/promesa/files/documents/1/01-4.pdf).
168
For purposes of this Comment, Fiscal Plan means Territory Fiscal Plan, unless otherwise noted by the
author.
169
See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(a).
170
Id. § 2141(c)(2).
171
Id. § 2141(c)(3)(A).
172
Id. § 2141(e)(1). If the Governor fails to submit a Fiscal Plan that satisfies all of the requirements under
subsection (b), then the Oversight Board must develop and submit a Fiscal Plan to the Governor and the
Legislature. If this is the case, then the Fiscal Plan is deemed approved by the Governor, and the Oversight Board
must issue a compliance certification for the Fiscal Plan to the Governor and the Legislature. See 48 U.S.C.
§§ 2141(d)(2), (e)(2).
173
48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) (“The term ‘Instrumentality Fiscal Plan’ means a fiscal plan for a covered
territorial instrumentality, designated by the Oversight Board in accordance with section 101, submitted,
approved, and certified in accordance with section 201.”).
174
Id. § 2121(d)(1)(E).
175
Id. § 2121(d)(1)(D).
176
These covered instrumentalities are: Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB), Highway
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at least three177 of the five Instrumentality Fiscal Plans, but is currently reevaluating revised Fiscal Plans of several covered instrumentalities.178
In contrast, a plan of adjustment is one that only the Oversight Board may
propose to restructure Puerto Rico’s debts, after the Oversight Board has
determined, in its sole discretion, that the plan is consistent with the applicable
certified Fiscal Plan.179 Like Fiscal Plans, there may be more than a single plan
of adjustment, depending on the number of existing Fiscal Plans certified by the
Oversight Board. Therefore, for every plan of adjustment, there must be an
applicable Fiscal Plan with which the plan must be consistent.180
Diagram A. Relationship between a Fiscal Plan and a plan of adjustment.
Fiscal Plan

Territory
Fiscal Plan(s)
plan(s) of
adjustment

Instrumentality
Fiscal Plan(s)
plan(s) of
adjustment

Title III of PROMESA (“Adjustment of Debts”) is like a hybrid of chapters
9 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.181 Like § 901 of the Code (“Applicability of
other sections of this title”), § 301 of PROMESA (“Applicability of other laws;
definitions”) incorporates nearly all of the Code sections that are made

and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), Public Corporation for the Supervision and Insurance of Puerto Rico
Cooperatives (COSSEC), Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA), and Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA). See Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight Bd. Confirms Receipt
of Fiscal Plans of Covered Instrumentalities (Feb. 22, 2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/.
177
See FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BD. FOR P.R., UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT APPROVING CERTIFIED
FISCAL PLAN, AS REVISED (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (GDB’s Fiscal Plan); COSSEC,
COSSEC FISCAL PLAN REVISED VERSION (AUG. 2017) (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/
(COSSEC’s Fiscal Plan); PRASA, FISCAL PLAN AMENDED TO INCORPORATE MODIFICATIONS TO CERTIFIED
FISCAL PLAN (2017), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (PRASA’s Fiscal Plan).
178
See Press Release, Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., Oversight Bd. to Review Commonwealth,
PREPA and PRASA Fiscal Plans (Jan. 25, 2018), https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/ (announcing receipt
of the revised Fiscal Plans).
179
See 48 U.S.C. § 2172(a); see also 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3).
180
48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3).
181
For example, § 312 of PROMESA gives the Oversight Board the exclusive authority to file a plan of
adjustment of the debtor’s debts, whereas § 941 of the Code gives the debtor the exclusive authority to file its
plan of adjustment.
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applicable to chapter 9. In fact, seventy-seven of the seventy-eight enumerated
Code sections that are applicable to § 901 are incorporated into Title III.182
Moreover, the statutory goal of Title III is arguably similar to that of chapter 11:
to get a plan of debt adjustment approved by the court.183 As is required in
§ 1129(a) of the Code (“Confirmation of plan”), Title III requires the court to
confirm a plan if the following seven requirements are met.184 Section 314(b) of
PROMESA (“Confirmation”) provides that the court shall confirm the plan of
adjustment if:
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of title 11, made applicable
to a case under this title by section 301 of this Act;
(2) the plan complies with the provisions of this title;
(3) the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action
necessary to carry out the plan;
(4) except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed
to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that on the
effective date of the plan each holder of a claim of a kind specified in
507(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, will receive on account of
such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
(5) any legislative, regulatory, or electoral approval necessary under
applicable law in order to carry out any provision of the plan has been
obtained, or such provision is expressly conditioned on such approval;
(6) the plan is feasible and in the best interests of creditors, which shall
require the court to consider whether available remedies under the nonbankruptcy laws and constitution of the territory would result in a
greater recovery for the creditors than is provided by such plan; and
(7) the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by
the Oversight Board under title II.185

While all of the seven conditions must be satisfied before the court can
confirm a plan, §§ 314(b)(1) through (b)(6) do not require the court to review
the Oversight Board’s certification determinations. It is § 314(b)(7) that creates
an internal inconsistency by suggesting that the court has the discretion to
determine whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with an applicable Fiscal
Plan. Section 314(b)(7) looks very much like § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight
182
See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012). The only section that was not incorporated to § 301 of PROMESA is
§ 301 of the Code.
183
EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 293.
184
48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(1)–(7).
185
Id. § 2174(b)(1)–(7) (emphasis added).
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Board”), which states that the Oversight Board “may certify a plan of adjustment
only if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable
certified Fiscal Plan.”186 The internal conflict created by § 314(b)(7) seems to
negate the Oversight Board’s sole discretion. Furthermore, this conflict may lead
to objections from holders of claims or interests allowed under § 502 of the Code
(“Allowance of claims or interests”)187 who reject the Oversight Board’s plan of
adjustment, which is essentially derived from the applicable Fiscal Plan.
Table B. Section 104 and Section 314 of PROMESA.
§ 104. Powers of Oversight
§ 314. Confirmation
Board.
(j) Restructuring filings.
(b) Confirmation. The court shall
confirm the
(3) Condition for plans of
plan if—
adjustment.
The Oversight Board may
(7) the plan is consistent with the
certify a plan
of adjustment only if it
applicable Fiscal Plan certified
by
determines, in
its sole discretion, that it is
the Oversight Board under title
consistent with the applicable
II [Responsibilities of
certified Fiscal Plan.
Oversight Board].
If a holder of a claim or an interest brings a challenge against the Oversight
Board, § 106(a) of PROMESA (“Treatment of actions arising from Act”)
provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise
arising out of this chapter, in whole or in part, shall be brought in a United States
district court for the covered territory . . . .”188 However, subsection (e) of § 106
declares that no U.S. district court shall have jurisdiction to review challenges
to the Oversight Board’s certifications under PROMESA.189 Although at first
reading it looks as though no court may review any of the Oversight Board’s
certification determinations, subsection (e) does not preclude higher courts from
reviewing challenges to the Oversight Board’s certifications. In fact, subsection
(b) provides that any action against the Oversight Board under § 106(a) shall be
“subject to review only pursuant to a notice of appeal to the applicable United
States Court of Appeals.”190
186
187
188
189
190

48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3) (emphasis added).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (incorporated into PROMESA § 301 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161(a) (2012))).
48 U.S.C. § 2126(a).
Id. § 2126(e).
Id. § 2126(b).
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When a holder of a claim or an interest objects to the Oversight Board’s
certification of a plan of adjustment, the litigant must appeal the case to a Court
of Appeals before the case can be reviewed, since no U.S. district court has
jurisdiction to review the Oversight Board’s certification determinations.191 In
contrast, a civil proceeding arising under Title III, or arising in or related to cases
under Title III, can be litigated in a district court.192
It seems ironic that one provision permits a district court to confirm a plan,
inter alia, if it is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, while another
provision prohibits the district court from reviewing the Oversight Board’s
certification determinations. The court determining whether a plan of adjustment
is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan is effectively equivalent to negating
one of the Oversight Board’s exclusive responsibilities laid out in § 201
(“Approval of Fiscal Plans”) and specifically, the Oversight Board’s sole
discretionary authority under § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”). Such
a conflict does not arise in the Bankruptcy Code.
C. How PROMESA Differs from the Bankruptcy Code
PROMESA differs from the Code in one major aspect: the confirmation
process of a plan of adjustment. Since the statutory goal of a chapter 11 case is
to get a debt restructuring193 and repayment plan confirmed by the court,194 it
can be argued that the statutory goal of a Title III case under PROMESA is
similar. In the most simplistic terms, under the Code, the debtor submits a
confirmable plan to the court and the court confirms it if all of the sixteen
requirements listed under § 1129(a) of the Code are met.195 However, under
PROMESA, the Oversight Board must have certified a Fiscal Plan before it can
submit a plan of adjustment to the court. There are seven requirements in total
that must be satisfied before the court can confirm a plan. Of the seven
requirements under § 314(b) of PROMESA, only one section creates an internal
inconsistency by requiring the court to review a plan that has already be certified
by the Oversight Board: § 314(b)(7).
A side-by-side comparison of § 314(b) with selective sections of § 1129(a)
of the Code shows that § 314(b)(7) is the only provision that does not have a

191

48 U.S.C. § 2126(e).
Id. § 2166(a)(2) (The district courts shall have . . . original but not exclusive jurisdiction or all civil
proceedings arising under this title . . . .”).
193
This Comment uses “restructuring” and “adjustment” synonymously.
194
EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 293.
195
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).
192
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comparable section in the Code and therefore the only provision that creates an
internal inconsistency. With the exception of § 314(b)(7), §§ 314(b)(1) through
314(b)(6) do not impinge on the sole discretionary authority of the Oversight
Board. These provisions instruct the court to perform nonconflicting tasks, as
similarly stated under § 1129(a) of the Code. For example, as illustrated by
Table C(1) below, § 314(b)(3) is substantially comparable to § 1129(a)(3) of the
Code.196 Section 314(b)(5) of PROMESA broadens the scope of court and
governmental regulatory approvals under § 1129(a)(4) and § 1129(a)(6) of the
Code by encompassing “any legislative, regulatory, and electoral approval”
necessary to carry out the plan.197 Additionally, PROMESA’s § 314(b)(6)
combines the requirements of both the “Feasibility Test”198 of § 1129(a)(11) and
the “Best Interests Test”199 of § 1129(a)(7) of the Code.
Table C(1). Comparison of Section 314(b) to Selective Sections of 1129(a).200
PROMESA
Bankruptcy Code
§ 314. Confirmation.
§ 1129. Confirmation of plan.
(b) Confirmation. The court shall
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only
confirm the
if all
plan if—
of the following requirements are
met:
(1) the plan complies with the
(1) The plan complies with the
applicable
provisions of title 11, made
provisions of this title.
applicable
to a case under this title by
section 301
of this Act;
(2) the plan complies with the
(2) The proponent of the plan
provisions
complies
of this title;
with the applicable provisions
of this
196
However, unlike the Code, PROMESA does not require the court to determine whether a plan has been
proposed in good faith.
197
Compare § 314(b)(5) of PROMESA with § 1129(a)(4) and § 1129(a)(6) of the Code.
198
Section 1129(a)(11) of the Code is also known as “Feasibility Test” by practitioners. See Jamie Harris,
Feasibility: Confirming a Chapter 11 Plan, DLG (Jan. 15, 2015), http://dlgfirm.com/feasibility-confirming-achapter-11-plan/.
199
Section 1129(a)(7) of the Code is also known as “Best Interests Test” by practitioners. See What is the
Best Interests of Creditors Test? CULHANE MEADOWS PLLC, http://chapter11dallas.com/chapter-11-businessbankruptcy/best-interests-creditors-test/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
200
Some sections of the Code are purposefully arranged in the order of relevance, and not arranged in
numerical order, to demonstrate their similarity to the corresponding section in PROMESA.
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(3) the debtor is not prohibited
by law
from taking any action
necessary to
carry out the plan;
(4) except to the extent that the
holder of
a particular claim has
agreed to a
different treatment of such
claim, the
plan provides that on the
effective date
of the plan each holder of a
claim of a
kind specified in 507(a)(2)
of title 11,
United States Code, will
receive on
account of such claim cash
equal to
the allowed amount of such
claim;

(5) any legislative, regulatory,
or electoral
approval necessary under
applicable
law in order to carry out any
provision
of the plan has been
obtained, or such
provisions is expressly
conditioned on
such approval;
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title.
(3) The plan has been proposed in
good
faith and not by any means
forbidden
by law.
(9) Except to the extent that the
holder of
a particular claim has agreed to
a
different treatment of such
claim, the
plan provides that—
(A) with respect to a claim of a
kind
specified in section
507(a)(2) . . .
of this title, on the effective
date
of the plan, the holder of
such
claim will receive on
account of
such claim cash equal to
the
allowed amount of such
claim . . .
(4) Any payment made or to be
made by
the proponent, by the
debtor . . . for
services or for costs and
expenses in
or in connection with the
case . . . has
been approved by, or is subject
to the
approval of, the court as
reasonable.
(6) Any governmental regulatory
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(6) the plan is feasible and in
the best
interests of creditors, which
shall
require the court to consider
whether
available remedies under the
non-bankruptcy laws and
constitution
of the territory would result
in a
greater recovery for the
creditors
than is provided by such
plan; and
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commission with jurisdiction,
after
confirmation of the plan, over
the rates
of the debtor has approved any
rate
change provided for in the
plan, or
such rate change is expressly
conditioned on such approval.
(11) Confirmation of the plan is
not likely
to be followed by the
liquidation, or
the need for further financial
reorganization . . .
(7) With respect to each impaired
class of
claims or interests—
(A) each holder of a claim or
interest
of such class—
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain
under
the plan on account of
such
claim or interest
property of a
value, as of the
effective date
of the plan, that is not
less than
the amount that such
holder
would so receive or
retain if
the debtor were
liquidated
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under chapter 7 . . . on
such date . . .
(7) the plan is consistent with
the
applicable Fiscal Plan
certified by the
Oversight Board under title
II.
In this respect, PROMESA’s most significant difference from the Code is
the establishment and creation of the Oversight Board.201 While the Code
reserves the right to file a plan of reorganization exclusively to the debtor,202
PROMESA designates that exclusive right to the Oversight Board.203 And the
Oversight Board must certify a proposed plan before the federal district court
for the covered territory can confirm it.204 In sum, the Oversight Board has the
sole discretionary power to certify a plan,205 and neither the Governor of Puerto
Rico (“Governor”) nor its Legislature206 can “exercise any control, supervision,
oversight, or review over the Oversight Board or its activities . . . .”207
Under PROMESA, there are at least two plans that need to be approved by
two different authorities before the court can confirm a plan of adjustment for
the debts of the debtor: (1) the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight
Board208; and (2) the plan of adjustment confirmed by the court. Whereas a
single confirmable plan is required under either of chapter 9 and 11 of the Code
for the reorganization of an entity’s debts, PROMESA provides that a plan of
adjustment must be consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan in order for the
court to confirm it.209 The problem is that this language seems to negate the
Oversight Board’s sole discretionary authority, which is evidenced by the
language in § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”).210
201
Title I of PROMESA establishes a Financial Oversight and Management Board. 48 U.S.C. §2121(b)(1)
(“A Financial Oversight and Management Board is hereby established for Puerto Rico.”)
202
11 U.S.C. § 941; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 941.02.
203
48 U.S.C. § 2172(a). Contra 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the
debtor’s debts.”).
204
48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(2)(B).
205
Id. § 2124(j)(3).
206
Id. § 2104(15) (meaning “the legislative body responsible for enacting the laws of a covered
territory.”).
207
Id. § 2128(a)(1).
208
See id. § 2141.
209
Id. § 2174(b)(7).
210
23 U.S.C. § 104(j)(3) (“The Oversight Board may certify a plan of adjustment only if it determines, in
its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.”).
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1. Section 314(b)(7) Gives Meaningless Power to Courts
To resolve the meaning of a statutory provision, a court begins its analysis
with the language of the statute itself.211 As currently written, § 314(b)(7)
necessarily prompts the court to review an applicable Fiscal Plan, which by
definition, has already been “submitted, approved, and certified, in accordance
with section 201.”212 This is no less than a challenge against the Oversight
Board’s certification determinations—and if so—the district court has no
jurisdiction to review such a challenge.213 But § 306(a)(1) of PROMESA
(“Jurisdiction”) provides that the district courts shall have original and exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction of all cases under Title III, unless Congress confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court, or a civil proceeding arising under, in, or
related to cases under Title III.214 In the course of reviewing whether a plan of
adjustment complies with the requirements set out in § 314(b) (“Confirmation”),
the presiding district court would almost certainly run afoul of § 104(j)(3)
(“Powers of Oversight Board”).
A simple rephrasing of the language by applying logic further reveals that
§ 314(b)(7) is superfluous. Section 314(b)(7) provides that the court shall
confirm the plan if “the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan
certified by the Oversight Board under title II.”215 In comparison, § 104(j)(3) of
PROMESA reads, “[t]he Oversight Board may certify a plan of adjustment only
if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is consistent with the applicable
certified Fiscal Plan.”216 Note that the word, “may” should really be read as
“shall,” because §§ 104(j)(1)–(2) provide that the Oversight Board “must”
certify the submission of a plan of adjustment.
Table C(2). Section 104(j) and Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA.
§ 104. Powers of Oversight Board.
§ 314. Confirmation.
(j) Restructuring filings.
(b) Confirmation. The court shall
confirm the
plan if—
(1) In general.—Subject to
...
paragraph (3),
211

See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. at 1946.
See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(10), (14), (22).
213
Id. § 2126(e).
214
See 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(2); see also 48 U.S.C. § 2168(a) (“For cases in which the debtor is a territory,
the Chief Justice of the United States shall designate a district court judge to sit by designation to conduct the
case.”).
215
48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(7).
216
Id. § 2124(j)(3).
212
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before taking an action
described in paragraph (2) on
behalf of a debtor or potential
debtor in a case under title III,
the Oversight Board must
certify the action.
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(7) the plan is consistent with
the
applicable Fiscal Plan
certified by the Oversight
Board under title II
[Responsibilities of Oversight
Board].

(2) Actions described.—The
actions
referred to in paragraph (1)
are—
(A) the filing of a petition; or
(B) the submission or
modification of
a plan of adjustment.
(3) Condition for plans of
adjustment.
The Oversight Board may
certify a plan
of adjustment only if it
determines, in
its sole discretion, that it is
consistent with the applicable
certified Fiscal Plan (emphasis
added).
As a matter of logic, the phrase “only if” in § 104(j)(3) indicates that words
that come after the phrase are a necessary condition to that antecedent. Thus
§ 104(j)(3) can be translated as follows: If the Oversight Board has certified a
plan of adjustment, then it must have determined, in its sole discretion, that the
plan is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.
Table C(3). Breakdown of Section 104(j)(3) of PROMESA.
Beginning of
§ 104(j)(3)
“The Oversight Board may certify a plan of
original:
adjustment . . .”
§§104(j)(1)-(2)
translated in
relevant part:

Before submitting a plan of adjustment on behalf of the
debtor in a case under title III, the Oversight Board must
certify the action.
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Beginning of
§ 104(j)(3)
rephrased:

The Oversight Board shall certify a plan of adjustment . . .

Rest of
§ 104(j)(3)
original:

“. . . only if it determines, in its sole discretion, that it is
consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.”
replace “only if” with “then” to form “if . . . then”
sentence structure


§ 104(j)(3)
translated:

If the Oversight Board has certified a plan of adjustment,
then it must have determined, in its sole discretion, that
the plan is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal
Plan.

Section 314(b)(7) reads, “[t]he court shall confirm [the plan of adjustment]
if the plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight
Board under [title] II.”217 When § 314(b)(7) is rephrased so that the if-clause
precedes the then-clause, then the revised sentence would read as follows: If the
plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, then the court
shall confirm the plan.
Table C(4). Breakdown of Section 314(b)(7) of PROMESA.
§ 314(b)(7)
“The court shall confirm the plan [of adjustment] if the
original:
plan is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan certified
by the Oversight Board under title II.”
Rephrased to
“if . . . then”

sentence
structure
If the plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board under title II,
then the court shall confirm the plan.

217

48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(7).
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PROMESA gives the Oversight Board the sole discretion to determine
whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan.218 By
definition, no other entity can make this determination. The if-clause of
§ 314(b)(7) can be translated as follows: “if the plan of adjustment [determined
by the Oversight Board, in its sole discretion] is consistent with the applicable
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board under title II . . .” then the court
shall confirm the plan. Section 314(b)(7)’s current language is confusing
because it seems to suggest that the court shall determine whether the plan of
adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, when in fact, only the
Oversight Board has the authority to make this determination.
When a certified plan of adjustment exists in the first place, it means that the
plan is already consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan because by virtue of
§ 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”), the Oversight Board has already
determined that it is so. If § 314(b)(7) were amended to improve clarity, it would
read as follows: The court shall confirm the plan of adjustment. Period. This
amended language is essentially the preamble to § 314(b) that precedes the seven
requirements that must be satisfied before the court can confirm a plan of
adjustment.219 Consequently, § 314(b)(7) is superfluous and serves no unique
function in PROMESA.
Table C(5). Application of PROMESA’s Section 104(j)(3) to Section 314(b)(7).
Simplification
§ 104(j)(3) translated:
§ 314(b)(7) rephrased:
If A, then B.
If the Oversight Board has If the plan of adjustment is
certified a plan of
consistent with the
adjustment, then it must
applicable Fiscal Plan
have determined, in its sole under title II, then the court
discretion, that the plan is
shall confirm the plan.
consistent with the
applicable certified Fiscal
Plan.


If A, then B.
If a plan of adjustment
If a plan of adjustment
If B, then C.
exists, then it is consistent
exists, then it is consistent
with the applicable Fiscal
with the applicable Fiscal
Plan. If the plan of
Plan. 
adjustment is consistent
with the applicable Fiscal

218
219

See 48 U.S.C. § 2124(j)(3).
See id. § 2174(b).
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Plan, then the court shall
confirm the plan.

If a plan of adjustment
exists, then the court shall
confirm the plan.

The court shall confirm the
plan of adjustment.

One of the three most important tools federal courts use to interpret statutes
is text.220 The U.S. Supreme Court follows as many as 187 canons of
construction to interpret statutes.221 In a famous law review article, the late
Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn has suggested that “there are two
opposing canons on almost every point,”222 therefore canons can be used readily
to cancel each other out.223 One canon of construction that may be invoked
against this author’s textual deconstruction of § 314(b)(7) is the rule against
surplusage. This rule stands for the proposition that one section of a statute
should not be construed in a manner that renders another section superfluous.224
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s preference for avoiding surplusage is not
absolute.225 Words must be read “in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme.”226
In the context of PROMESA, it is quite clear that Congress conferred upon
the Oversight Board a broad range of exclusive powers and responsibilities,
including the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan of adjustment, normally
reserved to the debtor under chapter 9 of the Code.227 The phrase, “sole
discretion,” describing the Oversight Board’s scope of power, appears twenty

220
The other two are purpose and legislative history. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & DAVID L. NOLL,
LEGISLATION AND THE REGULATORY STATE 91 (2015).
221
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Book Review: The New Textualism and Normative Canons, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 541 (2013).
222
Id. (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How States are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)).
223
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 912 (2016).
224
Id. at 923 n.51.
225
See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534
U.S. 84 (2001)); see also Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 384 (2013) (“The canon against surplusage
is not an absolute rule”)).
226
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 592 U.S. 120
(2000)).
227
See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (“The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the debtor’s debts.”).
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five times throughout PROMESA.228 As elucidated by the simple logical
restructuring of the sentences in § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of Oversight Board”) and
§ 314(b)(7) (“Confirmation”), the rest of PROMESA’s relevant provisions
strongly support the inference that Congress did not intend to give the court
authority to review whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with an applicable
Fiscal Plan.
2. Section 314(b)(7) Negates Oversight Board’s Sole Discretionary
Authority
Title II of PROMESA (“Responsibilities of Oversight Board”) provides for
the Oversight Board’s broad range of responsibilities concerning the approval
of Fiscal Plans. A “Fiscal Plan,”229 as used throughout PROMESA, is either a
Territory Fiscal Plan230 or an Instrumentality Fiscal Plan.231 A requirement that
is common to both definitions is that a Fiscal Plan must be “submitted, approved,
and certified in accordance with section 201.”232 This is important because one
of the requirements that must be satisfied before a court can confirm a plan of
adjustment is that the plan must be consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan
certified by the Oversight Board under Title II.233
The certification process is almost entirely the Oversight Board’s
responsibility. After the Oversight Board delivers a notice of schedule to the
Governor, the Governor must develop and submit a proposed Fiscal Plan to the
Oversight Board.234 As an ex officio member of the Oversight Board without
any voting rights,235 the Governor plays a subordinate role in supporting the
Oversight Board’s fulfillment of its responsibilities.236 The Oversight Board
228

The author has counted the number of times the phrase appears in PROMESA.
48 U.S.C. § 2104(10).
230
48 U.S.C. § 2104(22) (meaning a fiscal plan for a territorial government, which are Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, as defined in
§ 5(20)).
231
48 U.S.C. § 2104(14) (“The term ‘Instrumentality Fiscal Plan’ means a fiscal plan for a covered
territorial instrumentality . . . .” Territorial instrumentality means “any political subdivision, public agency,
instrumentality—including any instrumentality that is also a bank—or public corporation of a territory . . . .” as
defined in PROMESA § 5(19)(A) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 2104(19)(A) (2012)).
232
See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2104(10), (14), (22).
233
Id. § 2174(b)(7).
234
Id. § 2141(c)(2). The flipside of this process is the Oversight Board’s development and submission of
a fiscal plan to the Governor and the Legislature, if the Governor fails to submit a fiscal plan to the Oversight
Board. In this scenario, the proposed fiscal plan is deemed approved by the Governor. See 48 U.S.C.
§§ 2141(d)(2), (e)(2).
235
48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(3).
236
See id. § 2141(c)(2) (“The Governor shall submit to the Oversight Board any proposed Fiscal Plan
required by the Oversight Board . . . .”).
229
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then reviews any proposed Fiscal Plan against the list of fourteen requirements
provided in § 201(b) (“Requirements for Approval of Fiscal Plans”) and
approves the Fiscal Plan if it determines, in its sole discretion, that all of the
requirements are satisfied.237 A proposed Fiscal Plan must satisfy all of the
following requirements:
(A) provide for estimates of revenues and expenditures in
conformance with agreed accounting standards and be based on−
(i) applicable laws; or
(ii) specific bills that require enactment in order to reasonably
achieve the projections of the Fiscal Plan;
(B) ensure the funding of essential public services;
(C) provide adequate funding for public pension systems;
(D) provide for the elimination of structural deficits;
(E) for fiscal years covered by a Fiscal Plan in which a stay under titles
III or IV is not effective, provide for a debt burden that is sustainable;
(F) improve fiscal governance, accountability, and internal controls;
(G) enable the achievement of fiscal targets;
(H) create independent forecasts of revenue for the period covered by
the Fiscal Plan;
(I) include a debt sustainability analysis;
(J) provide for capital expenditures and investments necessary to
promote economic growth;
(K) adopt appropriate recommendations submitted by the Oversight
Board under section 205(a);
(L) include such additional information as the Oversight Board deems
necessary;
(M) ensure that assets, funds, or resources of a territorial
instrumentality are not loaned to, transferred to, or otherwise used for
the benefit of a covered territory or another covered territorial
instrumentality of a covered territory, unless permitted by the
constitution of the territory, an approved plan of adjustment under title
III, or a Qualifying Modification approved under title VI; and

237

48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).
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(N) respect the relative lawful priorities or lawful liens, as may be
applicable, in the constitution, other laws, or agreements of a covered
territory or covered territorial instrumentality in effect prior to the date
of enactment of this Act [June 30, 2016].238

If the Oversight Board approves the Governor’s proposed Fiscal Plan, then
it must deliver a compliance certification to the Governor and the Legislature.239
Once the Oversight Board certifies a Fiscal Plan, it can then file a plan of
adjustment240 that is consistent with the applicable certified Fiscal Plan.241 Even
before the Oversight Board can submit a plan of adjustment, it must certify the
act of submission itself242 as provided in § 206 (“Oversight Board duties related
to restructuring”).243 PROMESA requires the Oversight Board to perform one
certification after another and manifests Congress’s intent to give the Oversight
Board the ultimate decision-making power.244
Against this backdrop, § 314(b)(7) seems like a drafting error that
inadvertently negates the Oversight Board’s sole discretionary authority.
Suppose a court finds a particular plan of adjustment inconsistent with an
applicable certified Fiscal Plan and thereby chooses not to confirm the plan.
What does this mean? Has the court run afoul of § 104(j)(3) (“Powers of
Oversight Board”) by encroaching on the Oversight Board’s sole discretionary
power to certify a plan of adjustment?
Fourteen requirements must be satisfied before the Oversight Board can
approve and certify a proposed Fiscal Plan,245 and PROMESA delegates the
Oversight Board the sole authority to review a proposed Fiscal Plan.246
Almost247 every single requirement under § 201(b) (“Requirements for
238

48 U.S.C. § 2141(b).
Id. § 2141(e)(1).
240
Id. § 2172(a).
241
Id. § 2124(j)(3).
242
See id. § 2124(j)(1)–(2).
243
Oversight Board duties related to restructuring. Section 206(a) of PROMESA (codified as amended at
48 U.S.C. § 2146(a)) sets out the requirements for restructuring certification.
244
See 48 U.S.C. § 2146(b) (A vote of no fewer than five members of the Oversight Board is required to
issue a restructuring certification.).
245
Id.
246
See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).
247
This author qualifies the requirements as “almost” all finance-related because reasonable persons could
disagree that § 201(b)(1)(K) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan adopt appropriate recommendations submitted by the
Oversight Board under § 205(a)); 201(b)(1)(L) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan include such additional
information as the Oversight Board deems necessary); and § 201(b)(1)(N) (requiring that the Fiscal Plan respect
the relative lawful priorities or lawful liens in effect prior to the date of PROMESA’s enactment) are arguably
not finance-related.
239
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Approval of Fiscal Plans”) requires the performance of in-depth financial
analyses to ensure that a Fiscal Plan will “provide a method to achieve fiscal
responsibility and access to the capital markets . . . .”248 That an individual must
have “knowledge and expertise in finance . . . .”249 to be eligible for appointment
as an Oversight Board member—corroborates the fact that approving and
certifying a Fiscal Plan requires extensive knowledge in finance. When the
Oversight Board decides that a proposed Fiscal Plan is worthy of approval, at
that point the Oversight Board has already completed its analyses and
determined that each requirement has been met.
If the court is to ascertain whether a plan satisfies each requirement, the court
must necessarily engage in a reviewing process. For example, § 314(b)(6)
requires that the plan of adjustment must be “feasible and in the best interests of
creditors, which shall require the court to consider whether available remedies
under the non-bankruptcy laws and constitution of the territory would result in
a greater recovery for the creditors than is provided by such plan . . . .” The court
has to review at least two things: (1) whether the plan is feasible; and (2) whether
the plan is in the best interests of creditors. By the same reasoning, § 314(b)(7)
permits the court to determine whether the plan is consistent with the applicable
Fiscal Plan certified by the Oversight Board, when in fact, district courts are
prohibited from reviewing the Oversight Board’s certification determinations.
D. Development of Fiscal Plans Since PROMESA’s Passage
After Congress voted to pass PROMESA, then-President Barack Obama
appointed the seven members of the Oversight Board on August 31, 2016.250
Former Governor Alejandro García Padilla’s initial Fiscal Plan was rejected by
the Oversight Board for lack of debt sustainability analyses and returned to the
Governor for revision with a deadline of December 15, 2016.251 In March 2017,
the Oversight Board approved the revised Fiscal Plan proposed by the
succeeding Governor Ricardo Rosselló.252 By this time, members of the
Oversight Board had unanimously approved and certified the Oversight Board’s
voluntary petition under Title III before the U.S. District Court for the District

248

48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1).
Id. § 2121(f).
250
CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, P.R. IN CRISIS TIMELINE 9 (2017), https://centropr.hunter.
cuny.edu/sites/default/files/PDF_Publications/Puerto-Rico-Crisis-Timeline-2017.pdf.
251
Letter from José B. Carrión III, Chairman & Member, Oversight Bd., to García
Padilla, Governor of P.R. (Nov. 23, 2016) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/); see also CTR.
FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 10.
252
Id.
249
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of Puerto Rico, on behalf of Puerto Rico.253 United States Chief Justice John
Roberts appointed U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern
District of New York to oversee the Title III case.254 The Oversight Board has
since certified several Title III filings by Puerto Rico’s covered
instrumentalities.255
After Hurricane Maria swooped through the Caribbean island in September
of 2017, knocking out the island’s entire power grid,256 Puerto Rico incurred as
much as $95 billion of damages in additional debt,257 on top of its $123 billion
debt.258 The devastating storm has exacerbated Puerto Rico’s already-crippled
economy and further obscured its road to economic recovery.259 PREPA faces
millions of additional dollars in debt, on top of its more than $ 11 billion of total
liabilities in fiscal year 2017.260 This is a serious liquidity problem not just for
PREPA but for Puerto Rico, as PREPA is a key part of Puerto Rico’s debt
reconstruction.261
Puerto Rico’s certified Fiscal Plan—which was premised on no federal
funding—was no longer workable in the face of the new challenges. In the
immediate days following the catastrophic storm, the Oversight Board
authorized the Governor to re-allocate up to $1 billion of the Government’s

253
See Press Release, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Oversight Board
Certifies Title III Filings (May 3, 2017) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/); see CTR. FOR
PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 13.
254
CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES, supra note 250, at 13; accord General Guidelines to PROMESA
Title III, MCCONNELL VALDÉS LLC (May 5, 2017), http://www.mcvpr.com/newsroom-publicationsPROMESA-TitleIII.
255
See generally FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BOARD. FOR P.R., https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019) (listing documents of the Oversight Board’s unanimous written consents to Title III
filings by covered instrumentalities, including PREPA and PRHTA).
256
See Steven Mufson, Hurricane Maria has Dealt a Heavy Blow to Puerto Rico’s Bankrupt Utility and
Fragile Electric Grid, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/09/20/puerto-ricos-power-company-was-already-bankrupt-then-hurricane-maria-hit/
?utm_term=.f2f60aef92c2.
257
Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico to Redraw Plan for Ending Debt Crisis Due to Storm, BLOOMBERG
MARKETS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-31/puerto-rico-to-redraw-planfor-ending-debt-crisis-due-to-storm; see Yalda Hakim, Puerto Rico’s Hard Road to Recovery After Hurricane
Maria, BBC NEWS (Nov.10 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41929287 (“This is the largest
[Federal Emergency Management Agency] response in the Caribbean, the most catastrophic event in Puerto
Rico and probably in the U.S.”).
258
See Puerto Rico Debt Crisis: Making Sense of the Debacle, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-puerto-rico-debt-crisis/.
259
Kaske, supra note 257.
260
Alvin Baez, Puerto Rico Unveils Revised Fiscal Plan, CNBC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/01/25/puerto-rico-unveils-revised-fiscal-plan-no-debt-service-payments-for-the-next-5-years.html.
261
See Mufson, supra note 256.
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Territory Budget262 to respond to the damages caused by Hurricane Maria263 and
urged Congress to provide the maximum amount of federal assistance.264
Creditors were expected to concede to even steeper cut-backs on their debt
repayments than previously anticipated.265 On January 25, 2018, Governor
Rosselló submitted a revised Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth to the Oversight
Board.266 After a series of revisions, the Oversight Board certified the latest
revised Fiscal Plan for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico on October 23,
2018.267 The Oversight Board has also certified several revised Instrumentality
Fiscal Plans, including the Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing
Corporation (“COFINA”) and the Fiscal Plan for PREPA.268 COFINA is the
only instrumentality to have its plan of adjustment certified by the Oversight
Board, and a confirmation hearing is scheduled to be heard at the District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico on January 16, 2019.269
CONCLUSION
While a Fiscal Plan draws the big picture for a long-term fiscal and economic
growth of a target entity, a plan of adjustment is narrower in focus as it provides
for the treatment of various classes of creditors’ claims or interests against the
entity. Under PROMESA, only the Oversight Board may file a plan of
adjustment on the debtor’s behalf.270 It is the Oversight Board’s exclusive
responsibility to evaluate whether a proposed Fiscal Plan satisfies all of the
fourteen requirements set out in § 201(b) (“Requirements for Approval of Fiscal
Plans”). Without a certified Fiscal Plan in place, no plan of adjustment can exist.
The road to certifying a Fiscal Plan is complex and requires expertise in
finance and debt analyses. There is more than a single Fiscal Plan and
consequently more than a single plan of adjustment that must be consistent with
an applicable Fiscal Plan. An unsatisfactory Fiscal Plan is sent back to the
262
48 U.S.C. § 2104(21) (“The term ‘Territory Budget’ means a budget for a territorial government
submitted, approved, and certified in accordance with section 202.”).
263
Letter from Oversight Board, to Ricardo Rosselló, Governor of P.R. (Sept. 21, 2017) (available at
https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/).
264
Id.
265
See Kaske, supra note 257.
266
Baez, supra note 260. The revised Fiscal Plan called for zero debt service payments to its creditors
over the next five years.
267
Letter from Oversight Board, to Ricardo Rosselló, Governor of P.R. (Oct. 24, 2018).
268
Id.; FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BOARD FOR P.R., UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT CERTIFYING
COFINA’S FISCAL PLAN (2018) (available at https://oversightboard.pr.gov/documents/).
269
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (17-03283), PRIME CLERK, https://cases.primeclerk.com/puertorico/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2019).
270
48 U.S.C. § 2172(a).
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Governor with a notice of violation that includes the Oversight Board’s
recommendations for revisions to a proposed Fiscal Plan.271 Unexpected factors,
such as the catastrophic Hurricane Maria and the inadvertent drafting error
introduced by § 314(b)(7), delay the certification process—and ultimately
hinder the debtor’s efforts toward getting a plan confirmed. Because § 314(b)(7)
gives courts meaningless power and negates the Oversight Board’s sole
discretion as provided in PROMESA, it should be removed from § 314(b) to
maximize the efficiency of the bankruptcy system.
The Oversight Board was not designed to be in place forever. PROMESA
provides that the Oversight Board shall terminate if the Oversight Board certifies
that the applicable territorial government has adequate means to sustain its
markets and budgets for at least four consecutive fiscal years.272 The Oversight
Board exists for the purpose of providing a method for Puerto Rico to achieve
fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.273 In PROMESA,
Congress effectuated its intent to delegate broad powers to the Oversight Board
with respect to Puerto Rico’s fiscal policies. If the court steps in to review
whether a plan of adjustment is consistent with the applicable Fiscal Plan, it
would be a direct challenge against the Oversight Board’s sole discretion granted
to it pursuant to § 104(j)(3). While any challenges against the Oversight Board’s
certifications must be brought in the district court for the covered territory,274 it
is troubling to imagine that a district court would bring an action against the
Oversight Board in its own court.275 Confusion over this internal inconsistency
will almost certainly delay Puerto Rico’s debt adjustment process.
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See 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(3).
See id. § 2149.
273
Id. § 2121(a).
274
Id. § 2126(a).
275
District courts have the original and exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of all cases under Title III.
See 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(1).
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